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Ergativity and depth of analysis
In this paper, I argue that “depth of analysis” does not deserve the prestige that 
it is sometimes given in general linguistics. While language description should cer-
tainly be as detailed as possible, general linguistics must rely on worldwide com-
parison of  languages, and this cannot be  based on  language-particular analyses. 
Rigorous quantitative comparison requires uniform measurement, and this implies 
abstracting away from many language-particular peculiarities. I  will illustrate this 
on  the  basis of  ergative patterns, starting out from I.A.  Mel’čuk’s (1981) proposal 
for Lezgian. This proposal was not successful, but why not? And why is Baker’s (2015) 
theory of dependent case likewise unsuccessful? By contrast, quantitative worldwi-
de research has found striking similarities of  ergative coding patterns, which can 
be explained by  the efficiency theory of asymmetric coding. I will argue that this 
success is due to a more cautious approach to understanding Human Language, 
which does not rely on the Mendeleyevian vision for grammar (that all grammars 
are made from the same innate building blocks).
Key words: syntactic analysis, ergative construction, language typology, grammar 
blueprint
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Эргативность и глубина анализа
В статье я доказываю, что «глубина анализа» не заслуживает того авторите-
та, который она часто имеет в лингвистике. Хотя описание языка должно быть 
насколько это возможно детальным, общая лингвистика должна опираться 
на  межъязыковое сравнение, а  последнее не  может базироваться на  анализе 
конкретных языков. Тщательное количественное сравнение требует едино- 
образной общей меры, что означает необходимость абстрагироваться от мно-
гих частноязыковых особенностей. Этот тезис я проиллюстрирую при помощи 
анализа эргативной конструкции предложения, начиная от анализа эргативно-
сти в лезгинском языке И.А. Мельчука (1981). Этот подход не увенчался успехом; 
в равной степени неудачной оказалась и теория зависимого падежа М. Бейке-
ра (2015). Напротив, широкомасштабные квантитативные исследования обна-
ружили удивительное единообразие эргативных кодирующих техник, которое 
может быть объяснено теорией эффективности асимметричного кодирования. 
Я продемонстрирую, что в основе этого успеха лежит более осмотрительный 
и сдержанный подход к пониманию человеческого языка, который расходится 
с  «менделеевским представлением» о  грамматике, предполагающем, что все 
грамматики строятся из одних и тех же врожденных блоков. 
Ключевые слова: синтаксический анализ, эргативная конструкция, линг-
вистическая типология, модели грамматики
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In this short paper, I question the widespread idea that we need “deep” 
and “detailed” language-particular analyses as a prerequisite for a better 
understanding of general grammar, and I use the example of ergative 
constructions to illustrate this point.
Instead of deep and detailed analyses, I argue that what we need primarily 
is hypotheses that are objectively testable not only in principle, but also 
in practice. There is nothing wrong with detailed analyses, of course, and 
eventually we want them for all languages, but it is often simply presupposed 
that deep analyses contribute to a better understanding of Human Language 
(= to general linguistics, or g-linguistics). However, while such analyses 
of a particular language obviously contribute to a better knowledge (and 
perhaps also a better understanding) of this particular language (i.e. of its 
p-linguistics), general theories of Human Language must be based on general 
phenomena that do not depend on historical accidents, i.e. on grammatical 
universals.
Ergative constructions provide a good example in the present context, 
because the Moscow-trained linguist Igor A. Mel’čuk developed an interes-
ting account of ergativity in Lezgian which inspired me early in my career, 
and the Moscow-trained linguist Maria Polinky has a recent book about 
ergative constructions [Polinsky, 2016].1 But I will also discuss Mark Baker’s 
recent book Case (2015), because it represents a particularly influential line 
of thought in comparative grammar.
I will end up arguing that uniformity of “measurement” is crucial 
for objective hypothesis-testing, but I recognize that there is a serious 
alternative: What I call “building block uniformity”, based on the idea that 
there is a substantial set of innate building blocks (features, categories, 
architectures) which are part of a universal grammar blueprint and form 
the basis of all language systems. This view is akin to the idea of a few 
dozen chemical elements that all kinds of stuff are made out of, so I call 
it the “Mendeleyevian Vision” (cf. [Baker, 2001]). This view seems to have 
been adopted implicitly by many researchers, but once its implications 
are made explicit, it turns out to be quite unlikely (though not impossible) 
to be correct.
1 I mention this because the current paper is based on a presentation I gave in Moscow 
at the “Typology of Morphosyntactic Parameters” conference (October 2019), where Maria 
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2. The Lezgian ergative construction
Igor A. Mel’čuk (*1932) was a visiting professor at the University 
of Vienna in 1983, when I was a first-year student there. There I learned 
about Mel’čuk (1981; 1988), a paper that offers an intriguing theory 
of Lezgian clause structure: Mel’čuk claimed that Lezgian has no transitive 
ergative construction, but that its Ergative-marked argument, as seen in (1), 
is an oblique causal complement.
(1) Aлиди кицI  кьена.
 Ali-di kic’ q’e-na.
 Ali-erg dog kill-aor
 ‘Ali killed the dog.’
Basically, all Lezgian clauses are claimed to be intransitive, so that 
the clause in (1) literally means ‘The dog died through Ali’ (see also 
[Mel’čuk, 2013]). This is thus a kind of “semantic ergativity” – the agent 
participant is treated in a special way at the semantic level. It can also 
be seen as a type of “deep” ergativity, because it is not only relevant 
at a “superficial” level of case-marking or person indexing. It represented 
a kind of “depth” of analysis that was prestigious at the time (after all, “deep 
structure” was still very much alive in the late 1970s, not only in Mel’čuk’s 
framework), and that fascinated me in the 1980s.
But after studying Lezgian in some more depth (especially during my stay 
in Moscow in 1989–1990), I came to a different conclusion: In one of my first 
journal papers [Haspelmath, 1991], I set out to show that Mel’čuk’s analysis 
was wrong: (1) was in fact a transitive clause.
But how could I tell? What is a “transitive clause” in general? How 
can a grammatical term be applied to different languages with different 
properties? Mel’čuk provides detailed discussions of the terms subject and 
ergative construction, and I learned a lot from his careful approach to what 
our grammatical terms mean (see also [Mel’čuk, 1982]). But he did not 
apply the same criteria to all languages, as we will see below. Thus, even 
if the facts and arguments of my (1991) paper were wrong, his claim would 
still be without a proper foundation. I will elaborate on this below in §6, but 
first I will review a number of robust findings about ergative and accusative 
alignment. 
3. Ergative and accusative alignment and what we can explain
As all comparative linguists know, there are three widely attested alignment 
types, and two (mostly) unattested ones. This is true both for monotransitive 
clauses (with the arguments A and P, which may contrast with the intransitive 









argument S) and for ditransitive clauses (with the object arguments T and R, 
which may contrast with the monotransitive object P [Haspelmath, 2005]). 
Figure 1 shows the five logically possible types for monotransitive clauses 
















Fig. 1.  Five alignment types of monotransitive S, A and P:
a – accusative alignment; b – ergative alignment; c – neutral alignment;  
d – horizontal alignment; e – tripartite alignment
The last two aligment types are virtually unattested [Comrie, 1978], 
which has a well-established functional explanation: tripartite alignment 
is uneconomical, and horizontal alignment does not make the right distinctions 
(see also [Haspelmath, 2015] for ditransitive alignment). Moreover, when 
we look at the flagging [Haspelmath, 2019] of the arguments in these 
constructions, we find an overwhelming tendency for the flagging 
to be asymmetric: For well-understood functional reasons, when there 
is flagging, it is the P-argument in accusative alignment, and the A-argument 
in ergative alignment that is flagged, while the nominative and absolutive 
arguments tend to be unflagged [Dixon, 1979; Haspelmath, 2005].
Now in addition to these well-known and well-understood facts, there 
are further generalizations about ergative marking that are less well known 
and not so widely understood as functionally motivated. These generalizations 
concern the role of referential prominence when the flagging is differential. 
For example, in Godoberi (a Nakh-Dagestanian language that was studied 
in a 1993 field trip led by A.E. Kibrik), the ergative flag -di is found only 
on full nominals and 3rd person demonstratives, but not on 1st and 2nd person 
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(2)  Godoberi (Nakh-Dagestanian [Kibrik, 1996, р. 108])
 a. imu-di ʕali č’inni
 father-erg Ali(abs) beat.pst
 ‘Father beat Ali.’
 b. min ʕali č’inni (*min-di ʕali č’inni)
 you Ali(abs) beat.pst
 ‘You beat Ali.’
 c. imu-di min č’inni
 father-erg you beat.pst
 ‘Father beat you.’
This situation is sometimes called “differential subject marking” [de Hoop, 
de Swart, 2009], or more precisely “differential A marking”. We use this 
term when there is a flagging split conditioned by the referential prominence 
properties of the A-argument. The generalization can be stated as in (3).
(3) The DAM generalization
 Differential A-marking is found primarily with low-prominence  
A-arguments on the person scale, the animacy scale, and the focus 
scale, i.e.
 – with 3rd person (vs. 1st/2nd person)
 – with inanimates (vs. animates)
 – focused (vs. topic) nominals
This pattern is a universal tendency, as a mirror image of differential 
object marking (e.g. [DeLancey, 1981; Schmidtke-Bode, Levshina, 2018]). 
Differential object marking is much better known, but it is not so well-known 
yet that an analogous pattern is also found in ditransitive constructions and 
in scenario splits, and can be generalized as follows:
(4)  The role-reference association universal [Haspelmath, 2020b]
 Deviations from usual associations of role rank and referential 
prominence tend to be coded by longer grammatical forms 
if the coding is differential.
For example, differential object marking tends to be found on definite 
or animate nominals, and analogously, differential (ditransitive) R marking 
tends to be found on indefinite nominals [Haspelmath, 2007]. This is because 
the A and R arguments are usually associated with high referential 
prominence, while the P and T arguments are usually associated with 
low referential prominence. I have claimed that this is a frequency effect 
[Haspelmath, 2020b]: “Usual association” means that these associations 









are the most frequent ones, and hence the most predictable – which means 
that it is efficient if they get less coding than the less predictable meanings. 
The generalization in (4) is just a special case of a much larger generalization, 
for which I have formulated the efficiency theory of asymmetric coding 
in grammar [Haspelmath, 2020a].
There is no space to elaborate on this here, but the general point is that 
quite a few initially puzzling aspects of the grammar of ergativity have 
good functional-adaptive explanations, and these have basically been 
known since the 1970s and 1980s (see also [Moravcsik, 1978]). It is against 
this background that we will now look at some ideas that were advanced 
by generative linguists in the meantime. 
4. “Depth of analysis” and measurement uniformity
There is a widespread idea that good comparative grammar research must 
be based on “deep” or “detailed” analyses of particular languages, as opposed 
to the “superficial” or “coarse-grained” view of Greenbergian typology. 
This can be seen in quotations such as those in (5) (see also the discussion 
in [Croft, 2009, р. 147]).
(5) a. [Polinsky, Kluender, 2007, р. 275]
  “[Typology’s] allegiance to large samples and “superficial” 
generalizations is simply one of the consequences of casting the net 
wide and looking for differences in a quick and easy way.”
 b. [Polinsky, 2011, р. 661]
  “Such research allows us to uncover subtle distinctions and fine 
details of grammar that often remain unnoticed in a coarse-grained 
approach to language typology.”
 c. [Baker, 2015, р. 287]
  “This testifies to the deep unity of human language, discernable 
underneath the surface diversity of case patterns.”
 d. [Bobaljik, 2015, р. 318]
  “one of the hurdles to seeing more fruitful interaction between 
typological studies and formal generative approaches lies 
in the granularity of the questions being asked, and the degree 
to which we are ready to look beyond the surface descriptions, and 
to ask questions about patterns at a higher level of abstraction.”
 e. [Roberts, 2019, р. 12]:
  “From the perspective of generative grammar, much typological 
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I would like to argue that this very widespread view is mistaken. 
The negligence of “depth of analysis” in broad comparative research is not 
a bug – it is a desirable feature. 
It should go without saying that comparison of languages must be based 
on uniform “units of measurement”. In other words, the concepts which we 
use to compare languages must be identified in the same way in all languages, 
like yardsticks. This is what I call “measurement uniformity”, to be contrasted 
with “building block uniformity” below in §8. Linguists do not usually think 
of the concepts they use for comparison in terms of “measurement”, but 
I think that this is a very useful metaphor. All empirical sciences involve 
comparison of research objects, and in many sciences this clearly involves 
measurement. Comparative linguistics can be seen in a very similar 
perspective (see [Round, Corbett, 2020]).
So let us go back to the issue of how to identify (or “measure”) transitive 
clauses. A transitive clause is one with an A-argument and a P-argument, but 
how are A and P defined? Following Comrie (1978) and Lazard (2002), we 
can say that
 – A is the agent argument of a physical-effect verb like ‘kill’ or ’break’ 
(in the usual construction)
 – P is the patient argument of such a verb
 – S is the argument of a change-of-state verb like ‘fall’ or ’die’ 
(see [Haspelmath, 2011])
We also want to talk about the arguments of other kinds of verbs, but these 
are usually coded in the same way as the physical-effect verbs and the typical 
change-of-state verbs, so they do not need to be considered separately 
in the definition.
Since all languages have physical-effect verbs and change-of-state verbs, 
and nominal arguments with particular coding properties (flagging and 
indexing), these comparative concepts can be applied to all languages 
uniformly, using the same criteria of measurement. (Alternatively, one might 
also use more fine-grained semantic roles, as in [Hartmann et al., 2014], 
where we compared alignment patterns on the basis of over a hundred micro-
roles, which were semantically defined in the same way.) Since the universal 
claims of §3 are based on the well-defined notions of A, P and S, they 
are robust, and they can be readily tested, applying the same measurement 
criteria to all languages.
What is the alternative to this approach? One might try to compare 
languages in terms of a notion of “subject”, but how can we recognize 
subjects uniformly across languages? Again and again, linguists have 









defined “subject” in such a way that different criteria are applied in different 
languages, e.g.
“...the SyntSubj [is] cross-linguistically universal. However, in a different 
sense, the SyntSubj is language-specific in so far as syntactic privileges 
are different in different languages: thus, in many Indo-European languages 
the main privilege of a clausal element is to impose agreement on the Main 
Verb, while in Malagasy it is to occupy the clause-final position” [Mel’čuk, 
2013, р. x].
“We use the term ‘subject’ here as equivalent to what is termed ‘privileged 
syntactic argument’ (PSA) in Van Valin (2005) and elsewhere. A PSA 
is defined as the syntactic element that controls coding properties such 
as agreement and that is the pivotal element in complex constructions such 
as relativization, NP deletion, control, and so forth” [Riesberg et al., 2019, 
р. 524] 
But this procedure is unlikely to pick out uniform phenomena across 
languages – if different subjects may be recognized by different criteria, 
how do we know that they are all “subjects” in the same sense? Maybe 
if “subject” were an innate category of a grammar blueprint, a genetically 
encoded building block for grammars, this method would be justifiable. I will 
briefly discuss this possibility below in §8, but first we will consider a recent 
influential approach to ergative case-marking.
5. Mark Baker’s theory of “dependent case”
We saw in (5c) that Mark Baker is one of those generative grammarians 
who wants to go “below the surface diversity” of languages, so let us examine 
his recent theory of ergative case-marking. Baker (2015) presents a theory 
of “dependent case”, in which he says that grammatical case-marking patterns 
in the world’s languages are usually determined by dependent-case rules 
which roughly look as in (6) (the presentation here is greatly simplified).
(6) a. High case in the clause is ergative.
b. Low case in the clause is accusative.
c. High case in VP is dative.
e. High case in NP is genitive.
f. Unmarked case is nominative-absolutive.
So in a Lezgian clause like (7), the agent nominal Ali gets ergative case 
because it is “high” in the clause, the nominal za- ‘I’ gets dative case because 
it has a “high” position in the VP, and the “low” nominal ktab ‘book’ gets 








Rhema. Рема. 2019. № 4
(7)
Cls: NP   –> erg
VP:  NP  –>  dat
VP:   NP –> unmarked = abs
Aлиди  заз  ктаб  вугана.
Ali-di za-z ktab wuga-na.
Ali-erg I-dat book give-aor
‘Ali gave me a book.’ [Mel’čuk, 1988]
In my review of Baker’s book [Haspelmath, 2018b], I noted that this 
approach seems better than many other generative proposals in that it treats 
ergative marking in parallel to accusative marking and thus catches up 
to some extent with the insights of Comrie (1978), Moravcsik (1978) and 
Dixon (1979) that were mostly ignored by earlier generative researchers.2 
But elsewhere, he appeals to a movement operation in order to explain some 
case-marking effects, making use of a popular generative device that has no 
analogue in other approaches. For example, Sakha (a Turkic language) has 
differential object marking on definite nominals [Baker, 2015, р. 125–126], 
and the lack of object marking (as in 8b) is associated with directly prever-
bal order.
(8) a. Masha salamaat-y sie-te.
 Masha porridge-acc eat-pst.3sg
 ‘Masha ate the porridge.’
 b. Masha salamaat sie-te.
 Masha porridge eat-pst.3sg
 ‘Masha ate porridge.’
This can be seen when there is a manner adverb like türgennik ‘quickly’: 
This can occur between the verb and the object only when the object 
is definite and bears accusative case, as in (9a) (but not in 9b). (The examples 
in (8) and (9) come from [Baker, 2015, р. 125–126].)
(9) a. Masha salamaat-y türgennik sie-te.
 Masha porridge-acc quickly eat-pst.3sg
 ‘Masha ate the porridge quickly.’
2 Comrie and Dixon are well-known for having introduced the role-types S, A and P 
to describe accusative and ergative patterns. Baker uses “high” and “low” positions instead 
(defined in terms of c-command), but de facto, there does not seem to be much of a difference, 
because Baker determines these “positions” in semantic terms, not through any constituency tests 
(cf. his clear statement: “We should not expect to find many differences between c-command and 
a notion like thematic prominence, since the two notions are closely related” [Baker, 2015, р. 81]).









(9) b. Masha türgennik  salamaat sie-te.
 Masha quickly porridge eat-pst.3sg
 ‘Masha ate porridge quickly.’ (*salamaat türgennik siete)
Baker (2015, р. 126) appeals to a complex movement operation and an abst-
ract notion of “spell out domain” in order to explain the accusative marking 
in such cases. In this sense his description is not “surface-oriented”, but “deep”. 
But while his complicated story explains the Sakha object marking 
facts, he misses the generalization that differential object marking is found 
on definite objects also when there is no word order alternation, as in Hebrew 
and Romanian. By contrast, the role-reference association universal of (4) 
above makes no reference to word order, so it generalizes to these languages, 
and its explanation in terms of efficient coding does, too.
In addition to being insufficiently general, Baker’s theory in terms of “deep 
analyses” has the serious problem that it is not objectively testable. There is no 
unique way of determining a “deep analysis”, so Baker spends many pages 
on trying to persuade his readers of the correctness of his choices. His claims do 
not apply directly to observable facts of languages, but to particular analyses, 
where different considerations play a role for different languages. This means 
that we have to rely on the analysis being correct, but the analysis in turn relies 
on the general theory, so there is no way to make the process objective.
A striking example of this problem is Baker’s (2015, р. 222) discussion 
of the case of predicate nominals, which brings us back to ergativity and 
Lezgian. Baker notes that his theory would lead us to expect ergative 
case on the subject of a nonverbal-predicate clause such as (10), because 
the subject is “higher” in terms of the structure assumed by Baker. However, 
what we actually find in Lezgian is an Absolutive subject; here Baker cites 
an example from my (1993) grammar of Lezgian (although an example from 
any other language with ergative flagging would have done as well).
(10) NP
   NP
 Зи  буба  Йоханес  кешиш  я.
 Zi buba Joxanes kešiš ja.
 my father(abs) Johannes(abs) priest(abs) cop
 ‘My father Johannes is a minister.’ (from [Haspelmath, 1993, р. 311])
So why doesn’t the subject bear Ergative case in Lezgian? Baker proposes 
that there is an extra projection “EP” between the subject and the predicate, 
so that the relationship between the two nominals is not as local as it would 
need to be for ergative case to be assigned to the subject. We thus have the 
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(11) NP
   EP
    NP
The “E” slot (which projects an EP that prevents case assignment) is said 
to be generally empty, but may be attested in Tamil (which has a suffix -aa 
following the predicate nominal).
Thus, Baker makes the following methodological move:
(12) Hypothesize that an underlying element exists, and look  
for phenomena that might match this phenomenon.  
If there is something to be found (whatever it may be),  
this is taken as confirmation.
This method was called “diagnostic-fishing” in an earlier paper ([Haspelmath, 
2018a, р. 102]; [Croft, 2009] called it “methodological opportunism”). It is not 
a rigorous method, because there is no clear prediction that could be confirmed 
or disconfirmed. If nothing were found that might match the hypothesized “E” 
element, the hypothesis could still stand. Moreover, confirmation bias is one 
of the best-known problems in all domains of knowledge acquisition, and if we 
only look for confirming cases, we are likely to be led into wrong directions. 
Instead, we need an objective method of measuring and counting effects, 
where it is clear what kinds of phenomena would count as disconfirming 
cases. Thus, even though Baker’s analysis may look “deep” because of its 
complexity, it is actually not very reliable.
Another example of diagnostic-fishing is Baker’s treatment of oblique 
nominals. He observes that languages generally do not have ergative 
case on the subject when the second argument is oblique-marked, as seen 
in the following examples of languages with ergative flagging [Baker, 2015, 
p. 185–186].
(13) a. Ingush
 Ahwmad suona ulu laatt.
 Ahmed I.dat next.to stand.prs
 ‘Ahmed is standing next to me.’ [Nichols, 2011, р. 401]
 b. Shipibo
 Jose(-*kan) ochiti-ki raket-ai.
 Jose(-erg) dog-dat fear-impf
 ‘José fears the dog.’ (from Baker’s own primary data)
Baker’s theory predicts that Ahwmad in the Ingush example should 
be in the unmarked (absolutive) case in (13a), because the other argument 
is an adpositional phrase (a PP) and thus not sufficiently local. But Jose 









in the Shipibo example should carry ergative case, because the object nominal 
is not a PP, but an NP whose noun carries dative case. To solve this problem, 
Baker hypothesizes that such dative nominals are in fact PPs in Shipibo, with 
an empty adposition that assigns dative case. This makes the analysis more 
complicated, and Baker cites no independent evidence for it, but it allows him 
to save the general theory.
Elsewhere in his book, he posits not only empty adpositions (in PP) that 
assign case, but also surface adpositions that are really case forms (in NP), 
and surface case forms that are really adpositions (in PP) (2015, р. 2, 9).3 For 
such cases, he says that “the theory will have to decide (p. 13)” – in other 
words, the theory is not motivated here. Baker is aware that he should 
be able to provide such evidence, and he says that one must “hope that one 
can find some fine-grained syntactic properties which distinguish the two 
kinds [...]: a process of clefting, perhaps, or quantifier floating – the sorts 
of syntactic phenomena known to apply to NPs but not to PPs in some 
languages”. The theory is thus not so much built on actual in-depth analyses, 
but on the hope that after looking at more data, one will eventually find 
converging evidence that confirms the theory.
Many linguists have been skeptical of such abstract analyses that posit 
seemingly unmotivated zeroes, but what is the problem with abstract 
elements like zeroes? If “depth of analysis” is a virtue, then deep, abstract 
analyses should always give us greater insight. But even Baker is not always 
in favour of very abstract analyses. In the introductory chapter, he mentions 
the possibility that ALL languages have both accusative and ergative case 
at the syntactic level, and that they differ in that some languages spell out 
some of the case features by zero. Baker comments:
“We could contemplate taking a more radical view, which would claim 
that all languages are really tripartite languages in their syntactic case 
marking... Some strict minimalist theorists might find this view attractive. 
However, I believe that this universalist view goes too far. Rather, I claim 
that languages are parameterized...” [Baker, 2015, р. 25–26]
But how do we know that this degree of abstractness “goes too far”, 
whereas the level of abstractness that Baker chooses is the right one? It seems 
3 Zero adpositions that assign ergative case are also posited by Polinsky (2016) in her theory 
of two types of ergativity, but for rather different reasons than Baker. Polinsky wants to explain 
that some languages have extraction restrictions on ergative nominals, and she suggests that this 
is due to the PP status of ergative nominals in these languages. She devotes an entire chapter 
of her book (2016, р. 56–71) to discussing diagnostics of PPs that distinguish them from NPs, 
but she admits that “the paucity of strong operational diagnostics for PPs signals the need for 
more work in this area” (2016, р. 56). Thus, Polinsky has the same problems as Baker, and her 
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that the choices are subjective and depend on the researcher’s hunches, not 
any systematic research methods.
The alternative that I propose is to compare language structures not 
at some “deep” or abstract level of analysis that cannot be established 
objectively, but at the level of the community norms. In other words, 
we do not need a description that corresponds to the mental grammars 
of the speakers (let alone a description that is framed in the innate building 
blocks of a universal grammar blueprint). Thus, any pedagogical grammar 
should be sufficient for comparative purposes, and in fact, typological 
databases as exemplified by the World atlas of language structures 
do sometimes make use of information from pedagogical grammars. One may 
call this approach “shallow” (and thus frame it negatively), but I would call 
it “rigorous”, because the community norms are not in doubt in the same way 
as the hypothesized mental grammars. Thus, this approach allows objective 
comparison in a way that the grammar-blueprint approach does not allow.4
6. Mel’čuk and Lezgian again
Let us now get back to Mel’čuk and his discussion of ergativity in Lezgian 
and the notion of “subject”. He provides the following definition of “subject” 
(1988, р. 163):
(14) “A grammatical subject (GS) in L is either a basic GS or any other 
nominal that is most similar to the basic GS from the viewpoint 
of relevant syntactic properties {Pi}.”
In addition, he observes:5
“The syntactically privileged status of NPs is language-specific. Thus 
a syntactic property relevant in one language may turn out nonexistent 
or immaterial in another. For example, controlling the agreement 
of the main verb is a mark of privileged status in Russian or Italian, while 
it does not appear at all in Dyirbal, Lezgian or Japanese...”
He walks through a number of subject criteria and argues that the agent 
nominal in the presumed Lezgian “ergative construction” (as seen in (1), 
repeated here) lacks these subject properties (see [Haspelmath, 1991] for detai-
led discussion; in that old paper, I did not take issue with Mel’čuk’s definitions 
and methodology, but with some of the Lezgian facts that he presented).
4 Of course, the community norms are often variable, and thus present an independent 
challenge for description and cross-linguistic comparison. But the mental-grammar approach has 
these problems in addition to the problem of subjectiveness of choices. 
5 Essentially the same conception of the notion of subject is discussed in more detail 
in [Mel’čuk, 2013].









(1) Aлиди  кицI  кьена.
 Ali-di kic’ q’e-na.
 Ali-erg dog kill-aor
 ‘Ali killed the dog.’
Although Mel’čuk is not a Chomskyan and is not committed to the innateness 
of the building blocks of grammar, he still proposes that different languages 
can make use of different properties or criteria for determining which 
argument is the subject of a clause. In this regard, he is not different from 
authors like Baker, and his method is thus not objective.6
This can be seen in a footnote that was added to the second version of his 
paper (1988, р. 244), where Mel’čuk admits that A. E. Kibrik (1979–1980) 
has noted some phenomena that seem to contradict his analysis, because 
the ergative subject (and also the dative experiencer) seems to have the same 
privileges of occurrence in ‘want’ complements as the absolutive subject. 
In (15a-c), we see that not only the absolutive and ergative argument 
can be omitted in control constructions with ‘want’, but also the dative 
experiencer argument of ‘see’. By contrast, the dative stimulus argument 
of ‘look at’ cannot be be omitted in control constructions, as can be seen 
in (15d), where a different construction (using the converbal form of the verb 
rather than the infinitive) is used. (See also [Haspelmath, 1993, р. 295–298].)
(15) a. Гададиз   рушаз  килигиз  кIанзава.
 Gadadi-z [Ø rɨša-z kʰlig-iz kan-zava].
 boy-dat ABS girl-dat look-inf want-impf
 ‘The boy wants to look at the girl.’
b. Гададиз   руш  катаз  кIанзава.
 Gadadi-z [Ø rɨš kʰatʰa-z kan-zava].
 boy-dat ERG girl(abs) beat-inf want-impf
 ‘The boy wants to beat the girl.’
c. Гададиз   руш  акваз  кIанзава.
 Gadadi-z [Ø rɨš akʰwa-z kan-zava].
 boy-dat DAT girl(abs) see-inf want-impf
 ‘The boy wants to see the girl.’
6 Dmitrij Zelenskij (p.c.) points out to me, quite rightly, that generative syntacticians 
typically appeal to c-command relations when discussing syntactic-role phenomena like subjects 
and objects. But c-command is not directly observable, and tree structures are in fact often 
established in a circular way (by citing binding phenomena rather than standard constituency 
tests, on the assumption that binding is always governed by c-command, even though this is far 
from established). Thus, this is not any more objective than what I describe in §6. As Adam 
Tallman (p.c.) points out, Baker does not even provide any evidence for the claimed c-command 
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(15) d. Гададиз  руш  вичиз  килигна  кIанзава.
 Gagadi-z [rɨš üčʰü-z kʰlig-na kan-zava].
 boy-dat girl(abs) self-dat look-cvb want-impf
 ‘The boy wants the girl to look at him.’
However, these facts do not lead Mel’čuk to change his mind, and he 
concludes:
“I would still say that in Lezgian, the [absolutive nominal] of all verbs 
is the grammatical subject, that is, I would stand my ground anyway. 
The reason is that, to me, in Lezgian the property of PRO-control is motivated 
semantically... regardless of its actual surface-syntactic role... I consider 
the property “being a PRO-controller” as less weighty or less relevant than 
the previously considered subjecthood properties...” [Mel’čuk, 1988, р. 247]
So clearly, this represents an arbitrary choice of criteria. Unfortunately, 
it is not so uncommon in linguistics that the choice of criteria is made 
on an unprincipled basis, though it is rarely admitted so clearly. (Another 
example of this sort of honesty is Börjars (1998, р. 44), in a discussion of clitic 
vs. affix status: “The behaviour of elements is often not totally consistent. 
This means that in order to arrive at the conclusion that an element is either 
a clitic or an affix, certain criteria must be assumed to be less crucial.”)
So like Baker’s work on case, Mel’čuk’s work on “subject” and “ergative” 
illustrates the fact that we need to use the same criteria (the same yardsticks 
for measurement) in all languages if we want objective cross-linguistic 
comparisons. The definitions of A, P and S given in §4 can be applied to all 
languages in the same way. By these definitions, it is clear that Lezgian 
clauses like (1) have an A and a P and are thus transitive.
7. What “depth of analysis” is good for
I conclude from the discussion of the last two sections that that the much-
praised “detailed” and “deep” analyses of generative grammar may have 
limited value for comparative purposes. They presuppose that we already 
know the innate building blocks of universal grammar, but since we 
do not have any certainty about them (and in fact do not even have any 
concrete proposals, unlike the concrete proposals for innate building blocks 
of segmental phonology in the tradition of [Chomsky, Halle, 1968], i.e. 
the features), we cannot rely on them.
Of course, “detailed” study is good, and in fact necessary – we want 
to know everything about all languages. Not only all the words, but also all 
the constructions and all their interactions need to be studied. Grammatical 
descriptions should be comprehensive and complete, and as we now know, 









they should consist of many volumes to capture all the rules that speakers 
know, just as complete dictionaries sometimes consist of many volumes.
But “deep” analysis is not necessarily good, because it is often unclear 
whether our “deep” generalizations are actually true. In [Haspelmath, 1991, 
1993], I ended up saying that there is some evidence for a Subject category 
in Lezgian, because this allows us to generalize over intransitive Absolutive, 
transitive Ergative, and experiencer Dative arguments, which behave alike 
in ‘want’ complements clauses (see (15a-d) above). But the evidence for 
this is hardly compelling. There are only two rules of Lezgian that would 
have to be stated separately if there were no Subject category, so we would 
have six rules instead of two rules and one category. But all languages have 
thousands of syntactic rules anyway, so there are no strong reasons to think 
that Lezgian speakers must make this generalization and thus posit a Subject 
category in their mental grammars. Linguists do not make such calculations 
often, but in fact, our evidence that speakers make the same generalizations 
as linguists is often extremely limited.
Moreover, so-called “deep analysis” is often not so much motivated 
by the goal of understanding the structures of a particular language in very 
general terms, but rather by the attempt to fit the description of a language 
into a mould that is hypothesized to be an innate blueprint that universally 
applies to all languages. This blueprint approach has not yielded very clear 
results so far, so it is not something that studies of individual language would 
necessarily profit from.
8. Measurement uniformity and building-block uniformity
So to repeat the main point that I want to make in this paper: Instead 
of “depth of analysis”, comparative research is best based on objectively 
defined comparative concepts [Haspelmath, 2010]. In (16a-e), I provide 
some definitions of comparatively defined general categories that were used 
in the generalizations and explanations in §3 above.
(16) a. transitive construction: 
 = a minimal-clause construction with an A-argument  
and a P-argument
 [Haspelmath, 2011]
b. A-argument and P-argument:
 = the ‘killer/breaker’ argument of the verbs ‘kill/break’,  
and arguments that have the same kind of argument coding
c. argument coding:
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(16) d. ergative flag:
 = a flag that can be used for the A but not for the P or the S
e. S-argument:
 = the ‘faller/dieer’ argument of the verbs ‘fall/die’ and arguments 
that have the same kind of argument coding
On the basis of the notion of an “ergative flag”, one can formulate and 
test universals about differential ergative marking, as illustrated by Godoberi 
((2a-c) above). As we saw, these universals have a good functional 
explanation in terms of efficient grammatical coding.
The ergative concept in (16d) refers to a kind of concrete audible grammatical 
form, not to a kind of abstract case feature. This allows us to apply the concept 
also in languages where the syntax is more complicated than in Lezgian. Baker 
(2015) operates in terms of invisible abstract case features, which are often 
(but need not be) spelled out on the “surface”. For example, he assumes zero 
spellout for the classical Australian split-ergative languages, such as Diyari 
[Austin, 1981], whose case suffixes are shown in (17).
(17)   1st/2nd other pronouns full nouns
 A Ø -li -li (erg)
 P -na -na (acc) -Ø (abs)
 S Ø Ø -Ø (abs)
Baker regards such languages as having “tripartite case”, with widespread 
zero-realization. He thus misses the generalization that these languages 
conform to the high-level generalization about differential flagging that we 
saw earlier:
(4) The role-reference association universal 
 Deviations from usual associations of role rank and referential 
prominence tend to be coded by longer grammatical forms 
if the coding is differential. [Haspelmath, 2020b]
An ergative flag is not used with prominent (locuphoric) A-arguments, and 
an accusative flag is not used with non-prominent (full nominal) P-arguments, 
regardless of the syntactic features. And Arkadiev (2017) observes that when 
a language has two different ergative markers, there is a (slight) preference 
for the longer ergative marker to be used with less prominent referents. 
These effects of formal coding are predicted by efficiency of coding, but not 
by Baker’s abstract features.
But of course, Baker is not alone in adopting an approach that appeals 
to abstract innate categories. Like all generative grammarians, Baker assumes 
a universal grammar blueprint that gives us building-block uniformity: All 









languages are basically made from the same innate elements. These building 
blocks are not only the stuff of language-particular analyses, but also the basis 
of cross-linguistic comparison.
This is a possible methodological choice, but Baker and most other 
generative grammarians provide no arguments – building-block uniformity 
is often simply assumed, as if no alternative existed.7 But there is a clear 
alternative, which is better at least for the phenomena mentioned in this paper: 
Descriptive categories are used for language-particular generalizations, and 
comparative concepts are used as yardsticks for measurement uniformity 
[Haspelmath, 2010; 2018].
If one adopts an approach to comparison that does not rely on universal 
building blocks, this also means that it makes no sense to distinguish between 
“typology” and “theory”, as is done all too often. For example, Е. Lyutikova 
& А. Zimmerling say:
“The parameterization of linguistic diversity is an area that requires 
the collaboration of language typology and grammatical theory. 
Contemporary language typology is primarily an inductive science...” 
[Lyutikova, Zimmerling, 2018, р. 13]
On the alternative view, both comparative research and language particular 
research is theoretical (contrasting with applied linguistics, such as language 
pedagogy and translation studies). But there are two different types of theories: 
Language-particular research (p-linguistics) creates language-particular 
theories, whereas comparative research creates comparative and general 
theories (g-linguistics). The difference between generative (Baker-style) 
comparative grammar and Greenberg-style comparative grammar is that 
Baker-style comparison relies on innate building blocks, while Greenberg-
style comparison does not. Comparative linguistics is partly top-down and 
partly bottom-up, like all sciences. Maybe “inductive” here means that 
Greenberg-style comparative linguistics is less prone to making highly 
speculative proposals, but eventually, every theory needs to be tested, and 
every observation must find its place in some theory.
While I have been very critical of the idea of innate building blocks 
of a grammar blueprint, such innate categories with relevance to cognition 
are certainly possible. It is an established result that there are five basic innate 
tastes (sweet, sour, bitter, salty, and umami), and there is a widely discussed 
serious hypothesis that there are five basic innate emotions (e.g. [Barrett, 
2006]). Thus, there might be five basic innate parts of speech, or five basic 
7 Cf. Polinsky’s honest statement: “the building blocks are assumed, without much empirical 
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innate tense-aspect categories. This does not seem likely to most linguists, 
and in recent years, it has been suggested that “Darwin’s Problem” rules out 
this possibility because such categories could hardly have evolved during 
the short time that separates humans from apes (see [Berwick, Chomsky, 
2016]). But it is certainly a possibility that should be taken into account.
How do we find out which approach is on the right track? The answer 
is simple: We look which approach finds the better (more stable) theories 
which fit the world’s linguistic diversity better – though we should probably 
invest less in the building-block uniformity approach, because of its inherent 
unlikeliness. Baker (2015) has not compared his approach with those 
of Comrie (1978), Moravcsik (1978) and Dixon (1979), but simply dismissed 
these approaches as non-generative. But the old theories actually fare better 
[Haspelmath, 2018b, 2020b].8
9. Conclusion
The most general point that I want to make in this paper is that 
the primary contrast in comparative linguistics is not between “typology” 
(Greenberg-style) and “parameteric theory” (Baker-style), but between two 
methodological orientations: measurement uniformity and building-block 
uniformity.
In chemistry, the building-block uniformity approach has worked well, 
as is shown by the spectacular success of Mendeleyev’s Periodic Table 
of Elements. It is conceivable that it will work in linguistics as well – 
I call it the Mendeleyevian Vision (which is explained well in some detail 
by [Baker, 2001]).
But measurement uniformity, making use of clearly defined comparative 
concepts, is the more tractable approach, which allows us to engage 
in systematic and quantitative language comparison even before we have 
discovered the innate categories of our presumed grammar blueprint. This 
approach is based on the facts of languages independently of “deep” or highly 
abstract analyses, so its implementation does not have to wait for success 
in finding the innate building blocks of all grammars. We can identify 
universals of grammar like those in §3 and contemplate possible explanations 
for them without being certain about language-particular analyses and 
without knowing much about the innate predispositions for language.
8 To be fair, I should perhaps note that Baker sets himself two goals at the same time: that 
of explaining universals in the world’s languages, and that of using the same building blocks 
to describe the languages in an elegant fashion (cf. his 2018 reply to my 2018 review, p. 496). 
I do not think that this is the right strategy, as language-particular phenomena are often no more 
than historical accidents.
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